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[L. A. No. 27261.

In Bank.

May 21,1964.]

COAST BANK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. W. J. MINDERHOUT et at, Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Mortgages-Equitable Mortgages-Agreement to Give :Mort,age.-Every express executory agreement in writing whereby
the contracting party sufBciently indicates an intention to
make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation ereates an equitable lien on the property so indicated,
which is enforceable against the property in the hands not
only of the original contractor, but also of his purcllaSertl
or encumbrancers with notice.
.
[2] I4.-Equitable Mortgages-Agreement to Give Mortgage.-An
agreement that particular property is security for a debt gives
rise to an equitable mortgage even though it does not consti·
tute a legal mortgage; specific mention of a security interest is
unnecessary if it otherwise nppears thnt the purties intended to
ereate such an interest.
[8] Id.-Equitable Mortgages-Agreement to Give Mortgage.-In
an action to foreclose an equitable mortgage on certain real
property, where plaintiff pleaded and defendants admitted by'
demurring and failing to answer that plainti1i and the debtors
intended to create a security interest in the property by the
agreement signed by the parties, such pleaded meaning was
supported by provisions of the agreement restricting the rights
of the debtors in dealing with their property for plainti1f's
benefit, describing itself as ''For use with a Property Improve[1] See Oal.Jur.24, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, 112; Am.Jur..
Mortgages (1st ed § 14).
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Mortgages, § 13; [4] Covenants,
115.
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ment Loan," specifically setting forth the property it coverea,
ana authorizing plnintiff to record it.
[4] Oovenants-ltestrictions-Restraints on Alienation.-Although a written instrument creating an equitable mortgage on
certain real property and providing that the debtors would not
transfer the property without the creditor's consent contained
a restraint on alienation, such provision did not make the instrument invalid in an action by the creditor against transferees of the property, not to enforce the promise not to
transfer the property, but only to foreclose the creditor's
security interest therein.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Luis Obispo County. Ray B. Lyon, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to foreclose an equitable mortgage on certain real
property allegedly created by an instrument embodying
plaintiff's security interest in such property. Judgment decreeing foreclosure and ordering sale of the property
affirmed.
F. W. Audrain and Abraham Resisa for Defendants and
Appellants.
Baker, Farnham & Began and William D. Began for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Clinton & Clark, Russell E.
Teasdale and Robert D. Raven as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment foreclosing an equitable mortgage on certain real property in San
Luis Obispo County. The trial court overruled defendants'
general demurrer and upon defendants' failure to answer the
complaint decreed foreclosure and ordered a sale of the property. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. 4.)
From January 18 to November 12, 1957, plaintiff bankl
made several loans to Burton and Donald Enright, who executed a promissory note for the full amount of the indebted[4] See Oal.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, ana Restrictions, § 79
et seq. j Am.Jur., Perpetuitie~ and Restraints on Alienation (1st ed
§ 66 et seq).
IPonnerl)' kDOWD as Ba.nk of BelmOlit Shore.

)
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ness. In a separate instrument dated January 18, 1957,2 the
Enrights agreed that they would not transfer or encumber
without plaintiff's consent certain real property owned by
them until all of their indebtedness was paid. If the Enrights
defaulted, plaintiff could declare all remaining indebtedness
due forthwith. Plaintiff immediately recorded the instrument
as authorized therein. In November 1958, while part of the
indebtedness was still unpaid, the Enrights conveyed the
property to defendants without plaintiff's knowledge or consent. Defendants concede that they had not only constructive
but actual knowledge of the terms of the agreement. Plaintiff
apparently elected to accelerate the due date, but was unable
to collect the unpaid balance. It then brought this action to
foreclose the equitable mortgage that it clailns the instrument
created.
[1] "[EJvery express executory agreement in writing,
whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an inten2" AGR.ElWENT NOT To ENCUMBER OR TRANSFEB PROPERTY

" (For use with Property Improvement Loan)
"In consideration of any loan or advance made by Bank of Belmont

Shore (hereinafter referred to as 'Bank ') to the undersigned, either
jointly or severally, the undersigned (he]'einafter referred to 8S 'Borrower' whether one or more), jointly and severally promise and agree
that until all such loans and advances and all other indebtedness or
liabilities to the Bank shall have been paid in full, or until 21 years
following the death of the last survivor of the undersigned, whichever
shall :first occur, they will pay all taxes, assessments and charges of
every kind, imposed or levied, or which may be imposed or levied upon
the hereinafter described real property prior to the time when any .of
such taxes, assessments or charges shall become delinquent and will not,
without the consent in writing of Bank, first had and obtained, create or
permit any lien or other encumbrances (other than those presently exist·
ing and/or securing the payment of loans and advances made to them by
Bank) to exist on said real property, and will not transfer, sell, hypothecate, assign, or in any manner whatever dispose of said real property,
or any interest therein or any portion thereof, which real property is
situated in 8a" Lvii Ow.po County, California. ••• [Description
omitted.)
"It is furthel' agreed and understood that if default be made in the
performance of any of the terms hereof, or of any Instrument executed
by Borrower in connection herewith, or. in the payment of any indehtedness or liabilities now or hereafter' owing to Bank, Bank may, at its
election, in addition to all other remedies and rights which it may have
by law, declare the entire remaining unpaid principal and interest of
any obligations or indebtedness then remaining unpaid to the Bank due
and payable forthwith.
"It is further agreed and understood that Bank may, in its discre·
tion, and is hereby authorized. by Borrower, to cause this instrument to
be recorded at such time and in lueb places as Bank may, in its
discretion eleet. J J
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tion to make some particular property, real or personal, or
fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or
other obligation . • . creates an equitable lien upon the property 80 indicated, which is enforceable against the property
in the hands not only of the original contractor, but of his
•.. purchasers or encumbrancers with notice." (4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. Symons) § 1235.) Thus, a
promise to give a mortgage or a trust deed on particular
property as security for a debt win be specifically enforced
by granting an equitable mortgage. (McColgan v.' Bank 01
California Assn., 208 Cal. 329, 336-337 [281 P. 381, 65 A.L.R.
1075]; Daggett v. Rankin, 31 Cal. 321,327.) [2] An
agreement that particular property is security for a debt also
gives rise to an equitable mortgage even though it does not
constitute a legal mortgage. (Higgins v. Manson, 126 Cal.
467, 470 [58 P. 907, 77 Am. St. Rep. 192] ; Dingley v. Bank
of Ventura, 57 Cal. 467,472; Racouillat v. Sansevain, 32 Cal.
376,388-389.) If a mortgage or trust deed is defectively executed, for example, an equitable mortgage will be recognized.
(Burns v. Peters, 5 Ca1.2d 619, 625 [55 P.2d 1182]; Title Ins.
4f Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173,201202 [152 P. 5421; Earle v. Sunnyside Land Co., 150 Cal. 214,
227-228 [88 P. 920]; Peers v. McLaughlin, 88 Cal. 294, 297298 [26 P. 119, 22 Am. St. Rep. 306] ; Remington v. Higgins,
54 Cal. 620, 623.624; see Love v. Sierra Nev. Lake WGter tt
Mining Co., 32 Cal. 639, 652 [91 Am. Dec. 602].) Specific
mention of a security interest is unnecessary if it otherwise
appears that the parties intended to create such an interest.
(McColgan v. Bank of California ASBn., supra, 208 Cal. 329,
338; Earle v. Sunnyside LGnd Co., supra, 150 Cal. 214, 228;
Higgins v. Manson, supra, 126 Cal. 467, 469.)
[3] Defendants contend that the instrument did not create an equitable mortgage because it does not show on its face
that the parties intended to make the property security for
the indebtedness. They suggest that the parties intended to
protect the lender in another manner than by giving it a
security interest in the property and point out that the parties must have been familiar with the usual methods of creating a legal.mortgage or trust deed on real property. In their
view, plaintiff simply extended unsecured credit to the En.
rights as property owners while retaining the power to withdraw the credit by accelerating the due date of the indebtedness if the Enrights breached their agreement not to convey
or encumber the property. They invoke cases from other juris-
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dictions holding that comparable' instruments do not create
security interests. (B. Kll.ppenheimer cf Co. v. Mornin, 78
F.2d 261, 263-264; Fisher v. Safe Harbor Bealty Co. (Del.)
150 A.2d 617, 620; Western States Fin. Co; v. Buff, 108 Ore.
442, 449-454 [215 P. SOl, 216 P. 1020] ; Knott 'V. ShepherdstoionManufacfuring Co., 30 W.Va. '790, 796 [5 S.E. 266] ;
see also Osborne, Mortgages, § 44.)
In the present case, however, plaintiff pleaded and defendants admitted by demurring and failing to answer that the
parties intended to create a security interest in the property.
Accordingly, the' question presented is not what meaning ap- i
pears from the face of tIle inh~rumh ent alone, but. whether the '.'
pleaded meaning is one to w lC the instrument 18 reasonably
susceptible. (Richards v. Farmers' cf Merchants' Bank, 7
Cal.App. 387,395 [94 P. 393] ; see 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,
pp. 1231-] 232.) It is essentially the question that would be
presented had defendants denied that the parties intended to
create a security interl.'st and plaintiff had offered extrinsic
evidence to prove that they did. Such evidence would be admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a
meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible. (Imbo.ch
v. Schultz, 58 Ca1.2d 858, 860-861 [27 Cal.Rptr. 160, 377 P.2d
272J; see Rest. Contracts, § 235{d) ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1860;
Beid 'V. Overland Machined Prods., 55 Ca1.2d 203, 210 [10
Cal.Rptr. 819, 359 P.2d 251J ; Beneficial Fire d'; Cas. 1m. Co.
'V. Kurt Hitke d'; Co., 46 Ca1.2d 517, 524-525 [297 P.2d 428] ;
Barham 'V. Barham, 33 Cal.2d 416, 422-423 [202 P.2d 289] ;
BaZfour v. Fresno Canal cf Irr. Co., 109 Cal. 221, 225-226 (41
P.876].)
.
The instrument restricts the rights of the Enrights in dealing with their property for plaintiff's benefit; it describes
itself as "For use with Property Improvement Loan," it
specifically sets forth the property it covers, and it authorizes
plaintiff to record it. These provisions afford some indication
that the parties intended to create a security interest and are
clearly sufficient to support the pleaded meaning.
[4] Defendants contend that even if the instrument
created an eg.uitable mortgage, it cannot be given effect because it contains an invalid restraint on alienation. The provision that the Enrights would not transfer the property
without plaintiff's consent is ~ restraint on alienation. (Fritz
v. Gt.'lbert, 8 Cal.2d 68, 71 [63 P.2d 291]; Prey 'V. Stamey,
110 Cal. 423,426 [42 P. 908J; Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363,
. 367 [28 P. 118].) A restraint created by contract is governed

l'
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by the rules that govern a restraint in a conveyance (Prey v.
Stanley, supra, 110 Cal. 423,427), and it has frequently been
stated that any restraint on alienation is invalid. (Los
Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 682 [186 P. 596, 9
A.L.R. 115]; Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 216 [159
P. 590]; Murray v. Green, supra, 64 Cal. 363, 368; Title
Guar. ~ Trust 00. v. Garrott, 42 Cal.App. 152, 158 [183 P.
470].)
The view that the common-law rule against restraints on
alienationS prohibits all such restraints has been forcefully
criticized on the ground that it loses sight of the purposes of
the rule and needlessly invalidates reasonable restraints designed to protect justifiable interests of the parties. (See
Sweet, Restraints on Alienation, 33 L.Q.Rev. 236, 246-253;
Manning, The Development of Restra.ints on Alienation Since
Gray, 48 Harv.L.Rev. 373, 398-400, 406; Northwest Real
Estate 00. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 236 [144 A. 245] (Cbief
Judge Bond dissenting) ; cr. Simes & Smith, Future Interests
(2d ed.) §§ 1115, 1168; Bernhar,d, The Minority Doctrine
Ooncerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57 Mich.L.Rev.
1173, 1177.)
The protection of several such interests has been recognized as justifying reasonable restraints on alienation.
Spendthrift trusts are permitted because of the settlor '8 interest in protecting potentially improvident beneficiaries.
(Civ. Code, §§ 859, 867; Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438,
442-443 [53 P. 946, 41 L.R.A. 544].) A lease for a term of
years can be made terminable upon alienation because of the
lessor's interest in the personal character of the lessee. (See
People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal.2d 897, 901 [151 P.2d 641];
Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 426427 [14 P.2d 758, 85 A.L.R. 917] ; Murray v. Green, supra, 64
Cal. 363, 367; see RE'st., Property, § 410.) A life estate can be
made terminable upon alienation because of the interest of
the remainderman in the life tenant's character. (See Hall v.
Brittain, 171 Cal. 424, 425 [153 P. 906]; Rest., Property, .
§ 409.) A corporation can restrict the transfer of its shares
because of the interest of shareholders in the persons with
whom they are in business. (See Corp. Code, § 501, subd.
(g); Vann~cci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 143-145 [17 P.2d
706] ; Tu-Vu Drive-In Oorp. v. Ashkins, ante, p. 283 [38 Cal.

)
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Rptr. 348,391 P.2d 828].) A restraint on alienation in an
executory land contract has been upheld because of the 'Vendor's interest in the upkeep of the property and in the character and integrity of the purchaser. (Slomanv. Cutler, 258
Mich. 872, 876 [242 N.W. 735]; flee Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions inLand Contracts, 81 Mich.L.Rev. 1; In f'e
Congested Dists. Board (1919) 1 Irish R. 146, 150; ct. Rest.,
Property, § 416.) In the present case it was not unreasonable
for plaintiff to condition its continued extension of credit to
the Enrights on their retaining their interest in the property
that stood as security for the debt. AccordinglYt plaintiff
validly provided that it might accelerate the due date if the
Enrights encumbered or transferred the property.
Whether the promise not to transfer or encumber the property would be directly enforcible by injunction, specific performance or an action for damages is another question. It is
open to doubt whether such a promise would be a reasonable
restraint when, as in this case, plaintiff had the additional
protection of a security interest and the right to declare the
entire debt due in the event of default. It is unneceSsary,
however, to decide this question now. Plaintiff is seeking not
to enforce the Enrights' promise not to transfer the property
but only to foreclose its security interest. The creation of
that interest was a separate lawful object of the a,gl'-eement.
(Civ. Code,§ 1599; Bonnell v. McLaughlin, supra, 178 Cal.
213, 216; Murray v. Green, supra, 64 Cal. 363, 369.)
The judgment is affirmed.

J

Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner J., and Peek, J., concurred.
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